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Abstract 
Prior research has devoted limited attention to studying changes in organisational risk 
management (RM) practices. This is despite continuous dissatisfaction from academics and 
practitioners with organisations’ ability to manage risks. We draw on Schatzki’s social site 
ontology to study RM practices of two New Zealand local authorities that both experienced 
(earthquake) risk events and whose RM practices could be expected to change. We extend 
recent research utilising Schatzki, by finding that practical intelligibility and general 
understanding mutually affect each other in the organising of practices. Further, we extend 
Nama and Lowe’s (2014) addition to Schatzki by highlighting the importance of including 
teleological structures and accounting devices into the mutually constitutive relationship 
between general understanding and affectivity. Finally, we contribute to RM literature by 
proposing that changing the general understanding (in addition to the mere implementation of 
RM tools) is an important way of making RM change fundamental and sustainable. 
Key Words: accounting; risk management; Schatzki’s social site ontology; practice theory; 
qualitative case study  
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Risk management in local authorities: an application of Schatzki’s social site ontology 
1. Introduction  
Public sector organisations operate in dynamic and complex environments. Their multiple 
stakeholders may impose undue demands and judge performance using diverse criteria 
(Bryson, 1988). Good corporate governance enables public sector organisations to meet these 
demands, while simultaneously pursuing political, economic and social objectives (Collier & 
Woods, 2011). Corporate governance reforms require risk management (RM), as part of 
management controls, to reflect corporate risk appetites and assist in achieving corporate 
objectives (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Clarke & Varma, 1999; Collier & Woods, 2011). RM is 
said to have the potential to enable local authorities (LAs), with the responsibility for a broad 
range of public services and politically-active citizens, to be effectively governed and deliver 
improved organisational performance (McCrae & Balthazor, 2000). As such, a set of RM 
frameworks (e.g. Enterprise Risk Management) has been developed (e.g. Beasley et al. 2010; 
Collier et al., 2007), which prescribe fundamental RM principles and standard procedures for 
public sector organisations (like LAs) to deal with regular operational risks (e.g. Vinnari and 
Skærbæk, 2014). Yet contingent theorists note that contextual variables surrounding 
organisations’ operations affect RM framework choice (e.g. Mikes & Kaplan 2013; Woods, 
2009a). 
Further, the implementation and operationalisation of RM frameworks resemble a ‘black 
box’ prised open by recent research (Gurd & Hellier, 2017; Lim et al., 2017; Meidell & 
Kaarbøe, 2017; Fischer & Ferlie, 2013; Hall et al., 2015). These RM case studies examine how 
different groups of people act on and are acted upon by technical tools (including RM 
frameworks and accounting devices), how these tools influence decision-making processes and 
organisational RM practices, and the difficulties, conflicts and paradoxes arising therein. 
Research has also called for studies of how RM is integrated into daily decision-making, 
business operations and individuals’ behaviour (Zolkos, 2008; Bruno-Britz, 2009; Arena et al., 
2010). However, there has been no discussion of changes in RM practices, especially 
comparing public sector organisations. Generally, research finds that organisational RM 
practice may fail, cause uncertainties, or lead to the creation of new risks (Power, 2007; 2009; 
Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014). It is inevitable that organisations will respond to actualised risk 
occurrence and emergent risks. This is likely to result in changes in RM practice. Research to 
understand changes in RM practice would therefore enable better RM and enhanced 
theorisation of public sector risk management. Motivated by this gap, this research asks: How 
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is risk management practice organised and how does it change within LAs? To address this 
question, we analyse RM and accounting practices through practice theory. Specifically, we 
adopt Schatzki’s (2002) social site ontology that understands RM practices as bundles of 
human activity (comprising rules, understandings and teleo-affective structures) and material 
arrangements.  
We study two LAs in New Zealand (NZ) both experiencing and responding to major 
earthquakes (seismic events), which are ideal for insights into LAs’ organisation and changes 
in RM practice. These two LAs experienced similar major risk events in a similar time-frame 
enabling comparative insights into the extent of responsiveness to risk events, which a single 
case study does not afford. We expected, based on our preliminary analysis, that one LA, being 
proximate to an active seismic fault, is prepared and responsive to major earthquakes, while 
the other LA is unprepared with low prior seismic activity. Hence, the latter should undertake 
more extensive adaptations following the risk event. The case study choice follows theoretical 
sampling allowing ‘making comparisons’ and to ‘maximise opportunities to discover 
variations’ in organisational characteristics, the impact on RM practices and changes 
subsequent to similar risk events (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.201) . 
Empirically, RM practices within the two LAs are organised through interactions between 
organisational RM rules/frameworks, practical intelligibilities, and RM teleologies, affectivity 
and accounting devices (as per Schatzki, 2002). Overarching these are two general 
understandings - “open judgement” and “insular thinking”. These general RM attitudes are 
highly attributable to each Chief Executive’s (CE’s) practical intelligbility without which the 
development of such general understanding would not be possible. These general 
understandings at the same time partially frame operational staff’s mind-set on how risks 
should be managed, and override the rules-based practical understanding in determining these 
individuals’ RM actions. In this sense, we argue practical intelligibility and general 
understanding mutually affect each other. This extends prior research by showing how practical 
intelligibility interacts with other Schatzki elements in organising certain practices. Further, we 
show that end-project-task combinations and accounting devices may be structured to influence 
affectivity, which in turn shapes general understanding of RM practices within the two LAs. 
In addition, the general understanding affects individuals’ emotions and moods, and thus how 
they perform end-project-task combinations and utilise accounting devices in everyday RM 
practcies. We thus extend Nama and Lowe (2014) and Schatzki by proposing the inclusion of 
teleological structures and accounting devices into the mutually constitutive relationship 
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between general understanding and affectivity. Finally, this study builds on Fisher and Ferlie 
(2013) and Hall et al. (2015) by proposing that changing the general understanding (in addition 
to the mere implementation of RM tools) is an important way of making RM change 
fundamental and sustainable. We show that the change of general understanding following the 
actualisation of risk events may change people's emotions that have previously been found to 
drive resistance to RM change. These new emotions in turn are likely to fundamentally and 
persistently change individuals’ daily RM activities. 
 The next section reviews extant literature on RM practices, particularly within public sector 
organisations. Following an overview of Schatzki’s social site analysis, the research methods 
are outlined. Then, the findings are presented and RM practices in the two LAs analysed by 
insights regarding the nature and dynamics of Schatzki’s four elements. Finally, contributions, 
limitations and directions for future research conclude the paper. 
2. Risk Management Practices  
Risk awareness is stimulated by escalating business scandals, natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks and problems in emerging virtual markets. As such, RM permeates people’s daily lives 
and organisations’ everyday operations (Power, 2004). Unsurprisingly, prescriptive 
frameworks such as the COSO Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework and the 
International Standards Organisation’s (ISO) 31000: 2009, Risk Management – Principles and 
Guidelines on implementation evolve to guide organisations’ RM. ERM specifies actions to 
manage organisational risks including: risk identification, risk assessment, risk reduction, 
monitoring and control, adapted to organisations’ risk appetites (Themsen, 2014). Accounting 
should assist in operationalising ERM and similar RM frameworks through quantifying the 
probability of risk occurrence and severity of risk consequences; calculating risk 
tolerance/appetite; and performing RM cost/benefit analyses (COSO, 2004; Mikes, 2011; 
Paape & Speklè, 2012). Such prescriptive RM frameworks and accounting functions provide 
tangible processes to manage regular operational risks, and influence decision-making through 
vertically selling new ideas and risk technologies to top management, and horizonally 
influencing managers to use risk knowledge (Meidell & Kaarbøe, 2017). Through reducing 
risk exposure, RM frameworks and processes can improve organisational performance (Florio 
& Leoni, 2017).  
Despite the increasing popularity of ERM and similar prescriptive RM frameworks, some 
researchers question their effectiveness (Mikes & Kaplan, 2013). Prescriptive RM frameworks 
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can result in ‘box-ticking’ (Collier et al., 2007), or merely complying with pre-determined rules 
and processes. RM frameworks may even create second order risk or lead to the ‘risk 
management of nothing’ (Power, 2007; 2009). Practitioners also express dissatisfaction with 
these frameworks (CFO Research Services & Towers Perrin, 2008; Beasley et al., 2010). Such 
doubts have turned researchers’ attentions to contingent/contextual variables influencing RM 
framework adoption. Researchers find that boards and executive teams, internal risk specialists, 
risk type, the level of firms’ financial distress, firm size, industry affiliation, regulatory 
pressure, institutional ownership and auditor influence are associated with ERM adoption 
(Kleffner et al., 2003; Desender, 2007; Pagach & Warr, 2011; Paape & Speklé, 2012; Mikes & 
Kaplan, 2013). Woods (2009a) finds choice of risk control systems in public organisations 
depends on central government policies, information and communication technology, and firm 
size. Anderson et al. (2015) (studying inter-firm alliances) find formal controls are used to 
manage performance and relational risk, while firms facing compliance and regulatory risks 
tend to use informal controls. Woods (2009b) documents significant variations in the 
formalisation and complexity of RM systems in two UK organisations. Similarly, variations 
were found in studies into UK LAs (Crawford & Stein 2004) and Australian LAs (Barrett, 
2005; CPA Australia, 2002). Mikes (2009) argues that organisational culture is a significant 
contributor to such variety.  
Contingency theorists enhance our RM understanding by connecting prescriptive RM 
frameworks or ‘best RM practices’ to various contextual variables of regular operational risks. 
However, recent research, such as Power (2009) and Vinnari and Skærbæk (2014), argue that 
RM is more complex than merely matching a system to context. They call for studies of 
selection, implementation, use and operationalisation of RM systems for regular operational 
risks. Recent studies extend practice-based RM research by considering micro-level RM 
actions. In their bank case, Hall et al. (2015) find risk managers intentionally include others in 
developing RM tools by incorporating their feedback and knowledge and expressing explicitly 
their importance. By ‘including other people’, risk managers establish common ground 
between themselves and relevant organisational actors, increasing the communicability and 
acceptability of their RM plans and activities.  
While risk managers are influential in top management’s decision-making processes, 
Fischer and Ferlie’s (2013) longitudinal study of UK mental health care shows subordinates 
are strongly emotionally attached to implicitly self-regulated RM norms. Emotional attachment 
leads these subordinates to resist their superiors’ attempts to import and implement external 
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rule-based RM regimes (such as ERM). These emotions create enduring tensions between two 
RM regimes (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013). Using two cases, Gurd and Hellier (2017) demonstrate 
reconciliation and balancing of creativity and innovation with admistrative needs through 
organisational RM and management control. Practice in their organisations differ significantly; 
one ignores RM and management control systems completely, maintaining an innovation 
focus, while the other implements these systems but innovation fails to create value. In both, 
engineers rather than accountants operationalise RM and management control. Alternative RM 
(im)balances and conflicts are revealed by Lim et al. (2017) in Singapore banks, where front- 
and back-offices have significant differences in risk perceptions and understandings. 
Performance measurement and remuneration systems (management controls) that encourage a 
revenue-focus make the adoption of a three-lines-of-defence RM model (which aims to split 
responsibilities) ineffective. The RM model reinforces existing tensions and paradoxes. In-
depth understanding of behavioural dimensions is thus required (Lim et al., 2017).  
These qualitative studies demonstrate (sources of) variations of RM practices. However, 
except for Fischer and Ferlie’s (2013), there are still limited understandings of RM practice 
changes, especially public sector comparisons. Research to understand changes in RM practice 
may enable enhanced theorisation of public sector risk management and offer solutions to 
academics and practitioners’ continuous dissatisfactions with RM of regular operational risks 
(Power, 2009; Vinnari & Skærbæk, 2014).  
3. Schatzki’s Social Site Ontology 
Practice theories are useful to explain organisational phenomena across various disciplines 
(Nama & Lowe, 2014). These theories are particularly pertinent to understand holistically how 
LAs’ RM practice changes, especially following risk occurrence. Specifically, in order to 
understand the operationalisation of the RM rules/frameworks, RM teleologies and accounting 
devices as well as practical intelligibilities and affectivity, we employ Schatzki’s (2001a, 
2001b, 2002, 2012) practice theory. Schatzki’s is acknowledged arguably as the strongest 
practice-based theory (Nama & Lowe, 2014). Ahrens and Chapman (2007) and Jorgenson and 
Messner (2010) argue that Schatzki’s social site ontology can link organisations’ accounting 
and operationalisation of strategy, to uncover the “situated functionality” of management 
control practices. Thus, Schatzki’s practice theory is pertinent to explain accounting and RM 
in public sector organisations, particularly to examine LAs’ everyday activities and how they 
interact, respond, converge, or deviate from RM objectives. 
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According to Schatzki’s (2002) practice theory, organisational sites comprise a set of 
practices. Practices are unique, but intelligently coexist and connect. Public sector RM involves 
routine processes of adopting, implementing and using certain ERM (Crawford & Stein, 2004; 
Collier & Woods, 2011). ERM forms a ‘practice’ as evidenced by continuous controversies 
between organisational actors (Mahama & Yu Ming, 2009; Callon, 2007); reliance on personal 
and organisational culture (Mikes, 2011) and mobilisation of inscriptions and other material 
devices (Vinnari & Skærbæck, 2014). We now describe Schatzki’s elements as actions or 
material arrangements. 
Any practice (including RM) comprises a nexus of actions and material arrangements 
which, to be sustained, follow a certain order (Schatzki, 2002). Actions are organised by four 
phenomenon: (1) teleo-affective structures, (2) rules, (3) practical understandings, and (4) 
general understandings, as now described.  
Teleo-affective structures are practice properties, comprising teleology, affectivity, and 
related structural arrangements. Teleology embraces practice ends and/or goals. For example, 
the goal of private equity practice is to 'generate superior, “top quartile” returns to 
investors/LPs' (Nama & Lowe, 2014 p. 289) while in education, practice ends are educating 
people (Schatzki, 2002). In LAs we expect these to be focused on meeting multiple stakeholder 
demands in delivering their political and economic and social objectives. To realise RM 
practice teleology, staff/management pursue and execute projects and tasks structured to 
manage risks. Further, staff/management experience emotions (affections – Schatzki, 2002) 
like love and fear, which arise while executing these RM projects and tasks. Affectivity likely 
affects the achievement of teleological ends (Boedker & Chua, 2013), indeed teleology and 
affectivity interweave and determine participants’ commitments to operationalising RM. 
Teleo-affective structures affect/are affected by RM rules and understandings. When: 
‘understandings, rules, ends, and tasks are incorporated into participants’ minds via their 
“mental states”; understandings, for instance, become individual know-how, rules become 
objects of belief, and ends become objects of desire’ (Schatzki, 2002, p.480). As such, RM 
practice in public sector organisations transcends RM frameworks, reliance on RM culture or 
deploying technical analysis; due to rules, understandings and teleo-affective structures. 
For public sector RM, rules could be external frameworks or internally developed “best 
practice”. RM rules become legitimated principles to achieve organisations’ objectives. Rules 
also prescribe how risk is evaluated, considered in decision-making, application and 
compliance with RM frameworks. However, ambiguities exist. For example, when rules are 
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unsuccessful (Bromiley et al., 2015), deviate or conflict with organisations’ beliefs and 
traditional RM, practical understandings may prevail when operationalising RM. Practical 
understandings relate to practice actions: ‘knowing how to X, knowing how to identify X-ings, 
and knowing how to prompt as well respond to X-ings’ (Schatzki, 2002b, p.77). Organisations’ 
implicit norms (e.g. as promoted by top management) inform people’s practical understandings 
of how to perform projects and tasks governed by RM rules. However, Schatzki (2001b) would 
argue that practical intelligibility determines people’s RM actions. Practical intelligibility 
(what makes sense) is individualist (Nama & Lowe, 2014); related to personal goals, training, 
education and experience, prior knowledge of similar events and so on. It may result in RM 
rules being practised differently within an organisation - obeyed by some; modified by others, 
or even violated.  
While practical understanding relates to individuals knowing what actions to take and how, 
general understandings are practice elements reflecting people’s attitudes to performing an 
action (Schatzki, 2001b). These pervasive attitudes are shared by most people within a practice, 
and expressed in everyday sayings and doings. Nama and Lowe (2014) connect Schatzki’s 
general understanding to mattering. ‘Wonder and goodness and satisfaction are aspects [of 
general understanding] related to “how things matter”’ (Nama & Lowe, 2014, p.300). They 
propose a mutual constitutive relationship between general understandings and affectivity 
whereby people’s emotional attachment and sensitivity to certain RM actions may be driven 
by their understanding about these actions’ importance. Alternatively, affectivity may drive 
how RM actions matter because ‘how one perceives, how one argues and what one accepts as 
cogent or definitive are affected by ones’ moods’ (Schatzki, 2002, pp. 56-57).  
Schatzki (2002) notes actions are inter-related through: (i) chains (or sequences) of 
interrelated actions and (ii) commonalities/orchestrations. For example, to achieve certain 
public-related objectives, management may design a set of RM rules and require compliance. 
In participating, people respond to each other (Weick & Roberts, 1993). By agreeing, 
understanding and appreciating one another’s actions, they develop shared understandings 
(commonalities) of the meaning of risk and its management. Nevertheless, if participants’ 
interpretations differ, these orchestrations allow different simultaneous interpretations of the 
rules.  
Additionally, Schatzki (2002) recognises material arrangements are important in linking to 
chains of actions. Material arrangements include human beings, artefacts, other organisms, and 
the setting within which people act. These connect and mediate different actions. For example, 
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RM officers (human beings) connect and evaluate risk actions between different organisational 
levels/departments. Also, accounting formulations (artefacts) create a space of ‘intelligibility’ 
highlighting RM activities’ financial importance. Commonalities occur around imprecise 
accounting formulations, yet orchestrations promote innovations when those with different 
interests freely express their opinions (Jorgensen & Messner, 2007). Ahrens and Chapman 
(2007) state accounting calculations are artefacts, facilitating mutuality between strategic 
financial objectives and local shop-level operational practices in a UK restaurant chain. 
Accounting (artefacts) may promote and circulate certain affections, fusing individual efforts 
to achieve certain common organisational objectives (Boedker & Chua, 2013). Schatzki (2002) 
encourages examinations of how material arrangements organise multiple actions in a certain 
order and sustain commonalities and orchestrations among actions. We now describe our 
research method. 
4. Research Methods 
This research adopted the case study method as it facilitates a deeper understanding of 
complex social phenomena and novel issues, such as RM practice (Horton et al., 2004; Woods, 
2009a). We chose two New Zealand LAs as case studies – Wellington City Council (WCC) 
and Christchurch City Council (CCC). These two LAs are relatively similarly sized, avoiding 
size-driven differences in RM practices. The cases enable theoretical sampling (Yin, 1993) 
whereby differences potentially lead to variations in the patterns of phenomenon (theoretical 
explanations), hence theory validation. The two cities where the two LAs locate have uniquely 
experienced significant but similar risk events. One site (WCC) has considerable experience 
with seismic risks historically, while CCC has not. We expect the former to be more prepared 
following actualisation of the risk event, while the latter would require significant RM practice 
changes after the event. The case study period was December 2013 to February 2014. It was 
almost three years after the CCC risk event and six months after the WCC event, allowing the 
two organisations to have achieved a level of routineness and consistency in RM practices.  
We selected participants from different organisational levels to gain multiple perspectives 
on RM practices. Within top management, we sought views from councillors/the executive 
team (termed ‘Executive Managers’ (EMs)), and General Managers (GMs). Operationally, we 
approached managers of one business unit with perceived low risks (e.g. library/parking) and 
the other with high risks (e.g. natural resources (hazards)/business services) (termed 
‘Operational Managers’ (OMs)). Sixteen in-depth semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
across WCC and CCC. Interviewees’ roles were not necessarily matched across both 
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organisations, but the sample provides varied perspectives on the dynamics of RM practices 
within and across site(s). Our interview questions were guided by both RM literature and theory 
(Nama & Lowe, 2014). The questions were semi-structured to allow for interviewees to discuss 
other important aspects, and supplementary questions to arise (Walsham, 2006). Each 
interview lasted approximately one hour and occurred in a place chosen by the interviewee. All 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and, along with other data, uploaded to NVivo for 
subsequent qualitative analysis. Ethics approval was obtained from the relevant university 
committee. Further, we observed and made diary notes about two public meetings where EMs 
discussed risk-related issues and RM. These validated and enriched the authors’ understanding 
of RM practice within a “site”, especially in a formal setting where different actors interact 
with material arrangements (e.g. risk reports, PowerPoint, meeting room facilities). Perceived 
general understandings were validated through careful analysis of transcripts, diary notes and 
documentary data. For example a free and open discussion observed among WCC EMs in one 
public meeting was checked against interview data for organisational tolerance of differences 
in risk-related ideas and opinions.  
Interview and observational data were triangulated with documentary sources, including: 
publicly available websites, annual reports and risk documentation provided by the 
interviewees. This latter source particularly aids the understanding of rules and teleo-affective 
structures governing risk practices. Data triangulation increases the validity of findings (Yin, 
1993), and enables exploration of the actions and material arrangements under the four 
elements of the social site ontology framework and their inter-relationships in constituting RM 
practices.  
Importing data into NVivo, enables traceability of the chain of evidence (Yin, 1993). An 
initial coding tree was developed based on standard RM practice described in organisational 
risk documentations and our interview guide. This was undertaken by the research assistant 
and rigorously checked and validated by one of the authors. In the second level of analysis 
common themes run through each practice task, relating to common understandings across 
organisational practices and unique RM considerations including rules and structures. Hence 
the data were recoded into the new nodes in accordance with Schatzki’s elements: (i) 
teleological structures, sub-divided into ends, projects, and tasks, ii) general understandings, 
iii) practical understandings, iii) rules, and iv) material arrangements. To enable cross-site 
comparison and synthesis (Yin, 1993), we also established case nodes (i) WCC, and (ii) CCC) 
and a separate node within each case to code changes in RM practices after the risk event. This 
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step was undertaken by two of the authors and validated by the third author. The third level of 
analysis aims to derive unique insights explaining organisational RM practices. New nodes 
thus pertain to interactions between Schatzki’s key elements. This step was conducted 
concurrently by all the authors. We then manually coded each sentence, section or paragraph. 
Each node was printed out for separate and in-depth analysis of all relevant content across 
multiple sources of data related to a certain concept or issue, to enable validation of an insight 
through data triangulation as explained above. Furthermore, the different steps of data coding 
and analysis involved validation and cross-check by different authors, enabling inter-coder 
triangulation and hence the rigour of the findings and insights gained.  
The next section presents findings relating to the RM practices within each site. These arise 
from the third level of analysis and thus describe the four elements, but more importantly the 
interactions between these elements that drive the site-specific unique RM insights. To preserve 
the confidentiality of the interviewees, they are referred to by the respective level of 
management in the case organisation: EMs, GMs, and OMs and identified by number and 
organisation (WCC or CCC). 
5. Findings  
5.1. Local Government in NZ 
LAs represent a significant subset of NZ’s public sector, comprising 67 territorial authorities 
and 11 regional councils. Territorial authorities and regional councils undertake 
complementary functions, rather than being two levels of sub-national government (Pallot, 
2001). Regional councils’ core function is environmental management, whereas territorial 
authorities (LAs on which we focus) are responsible for a wide range of local infrastructure 
services including: water supply, sewerage, storm water, roads, environmental safety and 
health, and building control (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014). LAs are financially 
autonomous and, apart from grants for roading, receive little funding from central government. 
Their revenue derives primarily from property taxes (rates) and user-charges (Pallot, 2001), 
and they are accountable to their communities (Local Government Act, 2005). LAs are 
expected to use public money to provide public goods as understood by an interviewee:  
Even if the funding wasn’t rate funding for us in our situation, but we were providing 
public goods, there is a need and expectation… [we’ve set the] organisation up with a 
certain benchmark…we will engage and consult with you on what’s happening with the 
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money, you know we will have transparency…Some of that is legislated but some of it 
is a public expectation (GM3, WCC). 
Thus, meeting legislative requirements and public expectations is the teleology of RM practice 
in WCC and the interviewee suggests this likely applies to other NZ LAs. Further, since the 
1996 Local Government Amendment Act, LAs have been required to be show fiscal 
responsibility through ten year long-term plans which, since 2002, report financial forecasts 
and agreed service performance emanating from that (Local Government Act 2005). These 
plans are audited and supported by annual plans and reports. As such, there is close scrutiny 
into LAs’ operations which could be expected to face political, economic and environmental 
risks. The LAs studied are now presented, following the lines of Schatzki’s elements and 
drawing on the concept of risk faced by both LAs. 
5.2. Wellington City Council (WCC)  
The WCC is a territorial authority in the Wellington urban area with NZD 6,306 million in 
public equity. Sixty officially defined suburbs are represented by five Council wards. Its 
population of 204,000 makes it NZ’s third largest city. Seismic risk is a frontal concern due to 
Wellington’s vulnerability. WCC has planned earthquake-resistant buildings for 30 years, 
normalising management of seismic risks. However, a series of seismic events in mid-2013 
triggered strategic rethinking within WCC, to reconfigure how the LA could realise the 
common objective of meeting legislative requirements and public expectations. The practical 
understanding of knowing how to manage risks within WCC is shaped by compliance with the 
RM rules and systems. WCC’s pre-existing RM rule mirrors the NZS 4360:2004 RM Standard 
(WCC, n.d. (Risk Management Framework (RMF)), requiring WCC to use business cases and 
budgeting to justify and manage different RM projects. It must ensure that it “has the right 
systems in place and the right processes to manage [risk]…to be clear about what the risks are 
and to try and manage it in a sensible way” (EM2, WCC). To comply with this RM rule, WCC 
undertook a standard process of identifying, measuring and evaluating risks, discussing and 
communicating risks and treating risks through internal controls and monitoring (WCC’s 
RMF). For example, they:  
…measure risk… by… both the probability of a failure occurring and the consequence 
of the failure… so if it’s low risk with a high consequence, then it is high risk. And 
similarly if it is high probability but with a low consequence, it’s probably not as high 
a risk as the last… (GM1, WCC) 
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In addition, evaluating risks enables managerial prioritisation of mitigation actions as:  
The risk system which we use is like a heat map …we identify both likelihood and 
consequence and then there is some criteria around those like financial loss right 
through whether ‘has it got reputation risks, or loss of life?’…And then…you end up 
with a number which heat maps it from red down to orange down to green… (EM2, 
WCC) 
Hence, there is explicit recognition of the rigour of the current RM systems and the 
organisation’s ability to implement and uphold them.  
5.2.1 New CE’s practical intelligibility of “approaching financial sustainability” and the 
general understanding of “open judgement”  
The current council is known to be a “pretty socially liberal council but also economically 
adventurous” (EM1, WCC). There is a strong agreement among the WCC interviewees that 
the council has a particular way of operating, characterised by “open judgement”. Open debate 
is encouraged and differences in opinions are welcome.  
We will have healthy debate about things…I perfectly respect people who disagree with 
[certain ideas] But….they are not saying that the Mayor is stupid to do it…they are 
saying they disagree for these reasons… (EM1, WCC) 
I would think that this organisation is quite open. I have been to the council meeting... 
I give my numbers and recommendations, and the councillors would discuss. It is quite 
open. I think the same…at the operational level…we have regular meetings to review 
and discuss... Everyone can raise the issues they think are important, and have their 
opinions heard. (GM1, WCC) 
As the above quotes suggest, this “open judgement” atmosphere not only resides in RM 
practice but also permeates other practices and operations within WCC. Due to its widespread 
and common presence in multiple practices within WCC, Schatzki would term this “open 
judgement” as the general understanding.  
The general understanding of “open judgement” is highly associated with the appointment 
of a new CE who began three months before the earthquake and chose a leadership style which 
he continued to practice post-earthquake. He has a personal strategic vision of growing the city:  
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“The economy holds the key to our success. We need to invest in the right projects – 
projects that cut our costs, generate income or lead to economic growth, which in turn 
expands the business rate base”. (WCC, 2013) 
The CEO wants to make [the city] more business-friendly... [Business is] actually his 
strategic vision of growing, rather than growing [the city’s] revenue base by...putting 
rates up. Yes, he’s very much of that opportunity and strategic thinking…and the 
politicians kind of get that as well. (EM3, WCC) 
This also suggests that the new CE sought to infuse his own belief of growing the city through 
the management team and operational staff. His practical intelligibility and approach to 
financial sustainability is an important part in the development of the general understanding of 
“open judgement” within WCC: “I’m committed to leading an organisation that delivers, is 
accessible and open. (WCC, 2013). In particular, the new CE relies on establishing good 
systems to provide reliable data and placing competent managers in relevant positions to 
implement top management’s policies and actions: 
Well I think you start off by putting good managers in place and then…those good 
managers put the right systems in place to keep an eye on all of those things…Parking 
revenues, y’know, you’ve really got to have some good data… we need that data over 
a number of years to understand the profiles… Yeah you’ve got to have both really, the 
levers of good management, the people, the processes, the systems. (EM1, WCC) 
With regards to councillors, the new CE influenced them by explaining the rationale of the 
economic vision for growing the city and respective risks required to realise such vision: 
…if economic growth is our big objective as an organisation and we want to do that to 
grow our rating base so we have sustainable finance to provide good service…I need 
the right projects and the right sort of economic support arrangements in place to 
deliver against that agenda. Yeah…they are my initiatives, but we have agreed them as 
a council. The councillors are generally supportive…but the level of (risk) 
understanding is low…but here what we’ve gotta do is make sure that councillors are 
aware of the risks we are going to be running. (EM1, WCC) 
Explanations not only enhance councillors’ understanding of the new CE’s logic and approach 
of growing the city but also open the door for them to participate and contribute to further 
developments in this approach. The new CE’s action of bringing councillors on board is further 
demonstrated by not pre-dictating what the councillors will support (or oppose) and accepting 
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the decisions councillors make: “We have to put a strategy forward…we may make a 
recommendation to them…and then hopefully they will support that, but they might not, they 
might do something that runs higher levels of risk and then we have to face that. But we will 
need to inform them the calculated risks we are running.” (EM1, WCC) 
At the operational level, the new CE invested substantial time after starting (“a whole of the 
first 2 or 3 months”) in “just listening to people”. Through regular meetings and conversations 
with GMs/OMs he tracks targets and budgets, but equally importantly, is informed by these 
managers: “I have regular meetings with Heads of Services about 25 to 30 people in the 
organisation at a more senior level so it’s, y’know, you have those sort of conversations with 
them…I do a lot of walkabouts in the organisation just to talk to people and communicate with 
them.” He learned of emergent risks: “we’ve got lots of issues coming up like the parking 
contract award where there are new risk issues”. His regular contacts with and understanding 
of GMs/OMs mean they escalated appropriate risk issues to him. This in turn facilitates the 
‘open judgement’ atmosphere at operational level, as these managers see their views and 
opinions are listened to. Overall, through establishing good systems, placing competent 
managers, explaining the financial sustainability rationale of growing the city, seeking people’s 
participation and contribution, having regular contacts and meetings, the new CE has rooted 
his opportunity and strategic thinking into top management and operational staff that 
contributes to the development of an ‘open judgement’ general understanding within WCC.  
 5.2.2 The general understanding of “open judgement” and operational staff’s practical 
intelligibility of “willingness to try things” and “orchestrations in intelligibility” 
The general understanding of “open judgement” changed individuals’ approaches and the 
RM logic within WCC. Before the earthquake, WCC as a whole was dominated by “risk-
aversion” (OM1) preferring to “take the easy course rather than actually doing the right 
thing...i.e. stay the same...” (EM1, WCC). However, encouraged by the new “open judgement” 
operational and management style, staff have “more of a willingness to try things and if things 
don’t work, y’know don’t stop, change, do something different (OM1, WCC). Further, 
orchestrations in defining risk (the rationale) are accepted. As one of the interviewees explains: 
You might get slightly different views on that from different elected representatives so 
for example [the Council] happens to have a Mayor-bent and flavour… whereas some 
other participants in the Council process… will probably have a different view. We will 
get different perspectives around the table about, e.g. what is a strategic risk for the 
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Council. It is not driven off some kind off some sort of shared consensus on what they 
are. (EM3, WCC) 
The influence of “open judgement” general understanding on people’s practical intelligibility 
is so strong that the RM principles of “willing to try things” and “orchestrations in RM 
rationale” begin to transform the prior rule-based practical understanding and RM. Specifically, 
while continuing to apply the RM rule (for example, calculating residual risk, using a risk 
matrix and ranking), the approach is becoming flexible and dialectic, with the focus on the long 
term and opportunity-based risk thinking to risk identification:  
Judging what risks to focus on…I think that’s more art than science…it’s about the level 
of real risk you might face and a judgement about that… We even need to go beyond 
that because y’know there is a whole bunch of stuff that lies outside what we already 
know…We need to be as flexible and forward-looking as we can, to capture that. (EM2, 
WCC) 
I think you have to be cautious about things and you have to choose your risks, and 
those that you want to mitigate or monitor closely…If you become too risk averse, it just 
closes things down. Taking calculated risk is the preferred approach. (OM1, WCC) 
Other RM activities also evidence practical intelligibility of “willing to try things” and 
“orchestrations in RM rationale” changing how risk should be handled under rule-based 
practical understanding. For example, rule-based practical understanding requires RM 
personnel to rely on public consultations to appreciate the control environment: “Part of [the 
Council’s] role is to listen and take the pulse of the community before making decisions.” 
(WCC, 2013). However, RM personnel actually make their own “open judgement” when 
determining the level at which such consultations are useful: 
If I am completely honest there is the possibility… to get the risk appetite of our 
ratepayers and that must influence us because Councillors are elected representatives 
so that has to have an influence. In the end it is a political process. [But] it is unlikely 
that it is going to cause us to start from the very beginning. (EM2, WCC) 
General understanding of “open judgement” has encouraged orchestrations in individuals’ 
understanding of managing risks. Such orchestrations in practical intelligibility facilitate 
multiple risk interpretations and RM actions, which form various project and task combinations 
to realise the teleology of meeting legislative and public expectations. 
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5.2.3. Teleological structures disseminate “open judgement” general understandings 
directly and indirectly through affectivity 
The strong effect of “open judgement” general understanding on operational staff’s practical 
intelligibility of “willingness to try things” towards RM, synchronises with a teleological 
structure comprising several end-project-task combinations. Based on “open judgement” 
general understandings, top management disaggregated the common RM teleology (meeting 
legislative requirements and public expectations) into specific RM goals. These included 
minimising risks and undertaking effective RM actions, encouraging and improving economic 
growth, increasing preparedness for earthquakes and reducing their impact, addressing the risks 
of leaky homes, increasing safety of the workplace and returning sick/injured people to work, 
and protecting and maintaining assets. Top management also established RM projects and tasks 
to assist operational staff achieve RM goals. Of particular importance in the teleological 
structure is the communications/reporting system called ‘three-lines-of-defence’ (WCC, n.d., 
RMF).  
The ‘first line-of-defence’ results in operational staff collecting and discussing risk 
information before reporting to business unit managers. This line-of-defence requires the 
‘layperson’ (Callon 2007) low in the organisational hierarchy (e.g. operational staff) to take 
ownership and demonstrate accountability for risks upwards to their manager. “[risk 
information] would go to the unit manager concerned, or…to a team leader depending on what 
the risk was and what the project was and what the impact [was] going to be” (GM3, WCC). 
Upwards transparency was explicitly practised by WCC managers: “[I] also take an approach 
of having in my RM team, people who focus on the particular areas of the business, and they 
provide a means of questioning and challenging and allowing perhaps sometimes those issues 
to come up to the surface.” (EM3, WCC) 
As Callon (2007) recommend, WCC ‘laypersons’ were encouraged to actively communicate 
with and seek RM advice from risk experts - the Risk and Compliance team and Audit and Risk 
Committee. The Risk and Compliance team comprises the second line-of-defence being 
responsible for “developing the RM framework, monitoring risk registers and reports, 
undertaking risk reviews and monitoring RM controls”, as well as “reporting risk issues” to 
top management (WCC, n.d., RMF). Internal audit embodies the third line-of-defence, 
providing assurance and oversight of previous lines-of-defence, and reporting to the Audit and 
Risk Committee. The Audit and Risk Committee, decide which risks pose certain threats, 
updating the organisational-wide risk register (a material arrangement) which they monitor 
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along with top management. Finally, top management distils possible strategic risks into three 
strategic risks, clearly defined as “events that affect the achievement of organisational 
objectives” (GM1, WCC). The teleological ‘three-lines-of-defence’ structure is underpinned 
by communicating agreed plans downwards from GMs (in top management team) to 
operational staff. Within business units, communication of critical risk issues is facilitated 
through a set of material arrangements including team-based call trees, group texts in the case 
of emergency, intranet posts, and emails, as noted: 
…there is also an increasing integration of RM throughout the whole organisation…so 
whilst those people at the bottom (not a good term), whilst they don’t understand what 
the term [RM] is, they know what they have to do as far as health and safety, as far as 
business continuity, as far as making sure they have a call tree in place and all those 
kind of things. (GM2, WCC) 
The upgraded ‘three-lines-of-defence’ creates a bottom-up and top-down communication 
hierarchy (Cobb et al., 1995) allowing interactive, frequent, timely and open discussions on 
RM issues among WCC’s top management, operational staff and managers, risk and 
compliance team and internal auditors. Thus, WCC interviewees are confident that risk 
communication is honest and open: “we are not trying to hide anything so I think that’s 
positive…people trust what we are saying…we’ve been really up front” (GM3, WCC). This 
open and interactive communication hierarchy together with the ‘three-lines-of-defence’ and 
other RM projects and tasks signals a sense of importance of dealing with risks in a serious and 
open-minded attitude to people across WCC. 
The sense of importance of dealing with risks was further underpinned by an accounting 
device, performance development planning (PDP), arousing operational-level staff’s affection 
towards RM (Boedker & Chua, 2012). Staff are evaluated against a certain grading, which 
impacts their salary increments (OM1, WCC): 
Yes, they will influenced by something [a risk] identified and there are actions expected 
of them. I don’t think there is any doubt about that, because they know that cascades 
through to performance assessment of them individually. (EM4, WCC) 
Risk-related PDP and performance evaluation becomes an effective mechanism to ensure 
“there is personal commitment [to RM]” (GM2, WCC). “Everybody has objectives around 
health and safety which have to be met, otherwise they don’t receive a certain grading.” These 
influence salary increments: “so the grading is a 1 to 4. If it is a 2, they might not get a salary 
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increase. Or they might still get one [but] a smaller one” (OM1, WCC). Hence, the general 
sentiment is that RM is important and it is incorporated in PDPs.  
5.2.4. “Open judgement” general understanding influence affectivity and then the use of 
teleological structures and accounting devices  
As previously discussed, teleological structures (e.g. three-lines-of-defence) and linking 
RM actions to operational staff’s performance evaluation implanted the importance of RM into 
people’s hearts, constructing an affective sense of “materiality” towards RM. This affectivity 
in turn raised people’s attention towards RM and encouraged practising RM on a routine basis. 
However, these teleological structures and PDPs at the same time may generate risk aversion 
and curb orchestrations on what risk is, which goes against the “open judgement” attitude the 
new CE planned for WCC:  
To ensure the general understanding of “open judgment” is fully penetrated, an affective 
element was directly incorporated into the teleology of RM: “Health and safety is a standing 
item in every meeting. We (recently) adopted a really simple emotive statement, ‘everyone has 
the right to go home from work’” (GM2, WCC). This emotive statement mitigates the potential 
perceived negativity associated with the top-down imposition of teleological structures and 
risk-linked PDPs. Instead, by communicating the materiality aspect (i.e. RM relates to my 
rights and personal welfare), the emotive statement makes RM matter to staff and embeds of 
RM in daily operations and practices. Further, accounting devices are deliberately used flexibly 
to mitigate people’s worry and stress about failing to achieve the goals set in the PDP. By 
allowing for mistakes and exigencies, WCC aims to preserve and promote “open judgement” 
in their daily RM practices. It is in this sense that we argue that general understandings affect 
the design and use of teleological structures and accounting devices through affectivity. The 
direct incorporation of “affective element” and the flexible use of accounting devices enables 
a careful balance between holding operational managers accountable for risk-linked KPIs while 
ensuring that managers do not become risk averse and innovation is curbed.  
What we can’t do to staff is, tie them so tightly to [KPIs] that they can’t experiment or 
innovate as well. They will make mistakes sometimes, they will do things that are not 
consistent with the risk plans. For example, if we did all those eight big ideas, one of 
them might not work, but if all the other seven do…it will be great…we have to actually 
allow some opportunity. (EM2, WCC) 
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As a result, the purpose of the teleological structures and accounting devices was to facilitate 
decision-making rather than a legitimation tool “to get the boxes ticked”. The above findings 
extends Nama and Lowe (2014) by highlighting that teleological structures and accounting 
devices should be included in the relationship between general understanding and affections 
when studying certain organisational practices. 
5.2.5 Implanting fundamental RM changes 
Under the pre-existing RM rule, managers identified risk consequences, likelihoods and 
mitigation strategies; “then we would come up with kind of what we called a residual risk” 
(EM3, WCC). However, quantifying residual risk unintendedly diverted mangers’ focus from 
mitigation strategies and the accounting quantification no longer measured residual risk, but 
was: “focusing on the raw risk without taking all the factors into that raw risk then putting 
more priority on the mitigation strategies [to manage risk]…down to an acceptable risk for the 
Council” (EM3, WCC). Thus, the rule of risk quantification was deemed challenging and 
hindering to risk identification and evaluation. Furthermore, quantification diverted 
conversation from important RM questions.  
So historically when we have done our risk register…the conversation [was] ‘should 
this be No. 5 or No. 4 or No 3’. We have just moved away from that. [Ranking] masks 
some of the conversations about next steps, so the conversation should have been ‘have 
you put in mitigations’ and ‘are you comfortable about those mitigations’ and then, coz 
then it prompts you to have a really simple conversation, but difficult to answer. ‘Are 
you measuring the residual risk or the raw risk?’ So when you do it on a ranking basis 
it poses a risk in itself, but you don’t ask or pose yourself the appropriate questions 
which is ‘how to mitigate these’. The new system we have does that.... (GM2, WCC). 
The above quote suggests that WCC managers perceive quantifying residual or raw risk hinders 
“simple conversations” about RM strategies which matter to daily RM practices. Nevertheless, 
top management and operational staff agreed it was “not possible to define [risk] in a 
quantitative way” (EM2, WCC), rather a positive qualitative judgmental approach would 
enable important questions to be asked and answered. RM becomes "a little bit less driven by 
those rankings and the matrix" and instead driven "largely by the people" (EM3, WCC) and 
their practical intelligibility. Hence, WCC’s RM practice moved from rule-compliance to 
understandings-based (“a bit more by kind of what is qualitatively the level of risk we can put 
in place” (EM3, WCC)). Hence, while practical understandings remained unchanged, as 
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managers still knew (and followed) how to identify, measure, and assess risk exposure, the 
practical intelligibility had shifted. The action following risk assessment, under the rule-
compliance intelligibility was to rank the risks in the risk register. Under the understandings-
based intelligibility, the discussion focused on the raw risk and mitigation strategies to meet 
the Council’s risk appetite. Hence, whilst quantification-based understandings were still 
relevant, they contributed to rather than overrode the judgement of the mitigation strategies. In 
other words, RM becomes "a little bit less driven by those rankings and the matrix" and instead 
driven "largely by the people" (EM3, WCC). 
The shift from rule-based quantification to understandings-based judgement of RM 
practice is largely attributable to the dissemination of the “open judgement” general 
understanding within WCC. This general understanding originated from the “approaching 
financial sustainability” practical intelligibility of the new CE who was appointed three months 
prior to the earthquake and continued without change subsequent to that risk event. This “open 
judgement” significantly affects the practical intelligibility of operational staff, disseminated 
through the use of teleological structures and accounting devices, which in turn actualises 
affectivity of “mattering”. These elements together contribute to the implantation of 
fundamental change in RM practice to the qualitative identification and evaluation (Mikes 
2009) of strategic risks prevailing among all WCC staff levels. This broke the quantitative RM 
mode based on the pre-existing RM rule. By highlighting the changing of general 
understanding as important in embedding RM change, this study supplements Hall et al.’s 
(2015) call for finding appropriate “governance and incentive” changes to match with, and lift 
the impact of, new RM projects, tasks and devices. 
5.3 Christchurch City Council (CCC)  
We now turn to CCC, the territorial authority for the Christchurch urban area, comprising 
13 councillors elected from seven Council wards. It manages NZD7,081 million in public 
equity and its population is 366,000. Similar to WCC, the common teleology of RM practice 
within CCC is ‘meeting legislative requirements and public expectations’. In addition, the 
practical understanding of risk treatment within CCC is based on the ISO 31000:2009 RM 
Standard which “provides a consistent language in the consideration of risk across all the CCC 
activities” (CCC, n.d.). This standard is similar to WCC’s, requiring business cases and 
budgeting to justify and manage RM projects. Applying this rule involves a standard process 
of identifying and measuring risks, evaluating the likelihood and consequence of risk events, 
discussing and communicating risks and treating risks through internal controls and 
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monitoring. Unlike WCC, CCC previously was unconcerned about seismic risk, not being 
deemed to be on a seismic fault. Yet, during 2010 and 2011, Christchurch suffered devastating 
earthquakes, resulting in significant loss of revenue, dramatic property damage to the central 
business district and 185 citizen deaths. Earthquake devastation was followed by citizens 
demonstrating against CCC’s performance, calling for ‘leadership and transparency’ to move 
the city forward.1 As such, risk was understood as negatively hindering CCC’s timely post-
earthquake rebuild: “if the city rebuild does not happen on time, it affects the reputation of the 
council; respond[ing] not in the correct way...there is a reputational risk to the organisation” 
(GM1, CCC). 
5.3.1 Previous CE’s practical intelligibility of “minimising important issues” and the 
“insular thinking” general understanding 
According to Schatzki (2012b, p.3), general understandings are “elements of practices…and 
are senses of the worth, value, nature, or place of things, which infuse and are expressed in 
people’s doing and sayings”. CCC’s general understanding is “insular thinking” as explained:  
Y’know this is an organisation that was very insular. We had an audit undertaken on 
communications almost 18 months ago, an independent audit and that identified the 
fact we are an insular organisation, an insular-looking organisation, we don’t extend 
ourselves out into the community. (EM3, CCC) 
Besides “not being open to the community”, other evidence of insular thinking in CCC’s 
interactions with its key stakeholders include rarely looking for and communicating signals of 
“efficiencies” and “value for money” to them (GM1). The “insular thinking” general 
understanding is further infused in CCC’s everyday management and operations practices as 
this understanding implants “an interesting culture…where there is a whole range of complex 
behaviour issues going on, and not just an isolated behaviour…coming from this insular 
(thinking)” (EM3, CCC) . 
This “insular thinking” general understanding appears to originate from the practical 
intelligibility of the previous CE: “he had a very much a ‘business as usual approach’ that was 
very insular… [and]instilled a culture of minimising important issues” (EM1, CCC) through 
refusing to escalate key risks to appropriate top management levels (e.g. councillors) from 
within operational levels and business units. Another interviewee expressed the view that “a 
                                                 




change in CE will help change that insular thinking” (EM3, CCC), further illustrating the 
influence of the CE on the organisation’s culture. Besides the CE, the practical intelligibility 
of other senior managers also contributes significantly to the development of CCC’s insular 
thinking. These senior managers are operationally focused and reluctant to engage in strategic 
issues: 
We had a very good Chief Financial Officer who was quite strategic…but the remaining 
members of the team are very operational. They are not very strategic, just sitting around 
the teacups…We as a team have to consider and address and say ‘ok how do we deal with 
that from a policy perspective’…but there is a real reluctance to consider it, it is very much 
day-to-day operations stuff…(GM2, CCC) 
Despite the existence of teleological structures enabling strategic issues to be brought to top 
management’s attention, senior managers prefer to engage only on operational issues 
especially those relating directly to their area of responsibility, and relying on internal audit 
to manage the strategic risks: 
It is very much about operational risk not strategic risk… so there is a risk register that 
goes to the Executive Team (ET) and it is discussed but … things I was responsible for, 
certainly get reported but you don’t see any active addressing or prioritisation of the work 
to address those risks. It is not visible to me… (EM3, CCC) 
Due to limited resources…only key risks or material risks that will impact on CCC’s 
strategic and business objectives are recorded on the CCC risk register and administered 
by Internal Audit. (CCC, n.d.) 
Similar to the previous CE, these remaining senior executives tend to minimise important 
issues and prevent the council or the public being informed: 
PWC did an independent review… they identified a number of areas of risks that 
potentially were in breach of the Local Government Act, quite significant pieces of risk. 
[Xxx] went to present the information and the first words that came out of their mouth was, 
‘their report doesn’t look good, how do we get it changed?’ So I was quite flabbergasted 
at the attitude, and there was strong pressure to change the words to dilute the results. 
(EM3, CCC).  
The above evidence suggests that the “minimising important issues” practical intelligibility of 
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the previous CE and remaining senior managers established a sense of “insular thinking” 
infusing CCC’s operational staff’s daily activities. 
 
5.3.2 The “insular thinking” general understanding and operational staff’s practical 
intelligibility of “independent processing” and “box-ticking” 
This “insular thinking” general understanding moulds the RM practical intelligibility of 
CCC’s employees in two respects: “independent processing” and a “box-ticking” mentality. 
Employees believe that “independent processing” and “box ticking” underpin RM principles. 
Hence certain risks are contained within limited functions or business units, rather than being 
escalated upwards or outwards. First, “independent process” refers to employees’ reluctance to 
engage in substantial communication and coordination with other organisational members on 
risk matters. The “independent process” RM principle is exemplified in employees’ lack of 
active participation in discussing issues unrelated to their own operational area or expertise in 
the organisations’ risk meetings:  
So I have been to the ET, quite a number of times on proposals and you only get 
interaction from those that are affected by it. The rest will just sit there and they won’t 
consider it, or debate it, or provide any input. And it just reinforces that silo based 
thinking. So if an area of risk identified doesn’t impact one particular group manager, 
it is not considered important... So that reinforces the operational focus and it dilutes 
the sort of strategic, collective responsibility. (EM3, CCC) 
Second, the general understanding of “insular thinking” also results in a “box-ticking” RM 
mentality among individuals within CCC. By minimising issues locally and hiding them from 
the wider organisation through “insular thinking”, management advocates compliance as the 
“golden rule” for managing risk. Compliance is considered more important than dealing 
effectively with the substance of the risks. In turn, the “box–ticking” mentality has resulted in 
RM being a late add-on, rather than integrated throughout the decision making process: 
People see it as an extra thing they need to do and for some people, ‘oh god we need to 
do a RM assessment or something’. So we will go through and tick-box. But to me, it’s 
got to be an integral part of the way you do your work and not seen as something you 
tack on at the end. If you tack it on at the end, it’s too late… (OM1, CCC) 
Operational staff also exhibited the “box-ticking” practical intelligibility for RM as it enables 
them to gain approval for projects, rather than engaging genuinely with project-based RM. 
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Box-ticking, to these operational staff, means getting the (superficial) assurance of managing 
risks and avoiding escalating issues upwards in the organisation hierarchy.  
 
The practical intelligibility of “independent processing” and “box-ticking” is so strong that 
such intelligibility overrides the rule-based practical understanding on RM. Employees are well 
aware of how risks should be managed (according to the local authority’s RM rules) as GM1 
notes: “we have the expertise and skills… risks are well recorded, identified and reported”. 
However, these “signals of RM” are not accompanied by the necessity to “accept or even 
actively mitigate those risks right from operational staff through to senior management”. The 
intelligibility of being reluctant to actively manage risks and integrate formal RM as part of 
decision-making processes is counter to the objective of rule-based practical understanding: 
“there is reporting of risk but there is no active addressing or prioritisation of the work.” 
(EM3, CCC)  
5.3.3 The influence of teleological structures on “insular thinking” general 
understandings through affectivity  
To ensure compliance with the RM rule adopted by CCC, a teleological structure exists for 
upward risk communication: 
All of the areas of Council plug into a risk register and…different levels of the 
organisation look at risk in different ways. So the lower down [staff], they look at the 
nuts and bolts of the risk and what happens if this happens and that. But then what we 
do is elevate those risks up generically so that the middle managers, they are more 
about looking at their area of responsibility and looking at the overall risks in there, 
not the detailed risks. If the risks are strategic, then they flow right up to the senior 
management team. (GM1, CCC) 
Whether this occurs is debateable. Furthermore, a new rule across all projects and tasks requires 
cost-effectiveness and provision of value-for-money. To this end, operational and project 
managers must prepare a business case for all proposed projects, which are reviewed and 
approved/refused by top management in their regular risk review meetings. A project approved 
following this is prioritised for capital expenditure funding. 
We will be developing a framework for what a business case for the council should look 
like, it will be based on better business cases but that will be the basis for 
taking…capital projects forward, which is a positive step. And in our initial discussions 
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it is not just the financial elements, it is the risk elements as well which we have talked 
about. (GM1, CCC) 
In addition to top management’s intensive rule compliance efforts, CCC adopted another 
teleological structure to ensure rules are strictly followed at operational-level. Specifically, a 
risk expert (the ‘business assurance manager’) who is responsible for “developing ERM 
processes and methodologies, and facilitating risk discussions with top management, the Risk 
and Audit Committee and the Council” (CCC, n.d., RMF). Supported by “laypersons” such as 
business unit managers and other operational staff, the CCC’s business assurance manager’s 
role is similar to WCC’s Risk and Compliance team. Different to WCC, CCC’s teleological 
structure does not involve staff accountability as the first line-of-defence but is designed to 
hold the business assurance manager accountable for RM. This effectively removes operational 
staff’s risk ownership, therefore the teleological structure promotes the sense that external 
regulations are prioritised rather than improved organisational RM practice. RM is not 
personalised, nor shown as everyone’s responsibility and worthy of attention. This sense of 
“strict rule compliance to meet external regulations as an insular exercise” is reflected in 
operational staff’s easy-going attitude that was aptly described as “she’ll be alright, take it in 
your stride, we will deal with it (risk) when it happens” (GM2, CCC). In this sense the 
teleological structure helped craft a sense of “not mattering” towards RM among employees 
within CCC. An easy-going attitude affection is general and not limited to RM practice, but 
rather appears as an organisational-level phenomenon as noted above.  
Thus, the end-project-task combinations involving “upward risk communication” and the 
“business assurance manager” for the purpose of meeting external risk management regulations 
reinforce the general understanding of CCC’s insular thinking. 
5.3.4 “Insular thinking” general understanding affects the use of teleological structures 
via affectivity 
The general understanding of insular thinking towards RM entailed operational staff’s 
affection of “fears of wrong-doings”. In a public sector organisation, it is easier to “avoid 
making a mistake rather than taking a risk and actually sorting it out [as] it is harder to change 
and improve than staying the same” (EM1, CCC). This preferred position of not doing/the 
status quo, further reinforced operational staff’s attitude on RM as a superfluous addition. This 
affectivity of “fears of wrong-doings” exacerbates the logic of “independent process” and 
“box-ticking exercise” to deal with risks, which in turn affects how teleological structures and 
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accounting devices are used in RM (Ferlie and Fisher 2013). For example, “[operational-level 
staff] still have the attitude of spending the money they have budgeted rather than ‘how do I 
deliver something’ and then look at the budget issues after that” (EM3, CCC). Neither the 
budgets, nor the business case requirement (accounting devices) are used widely at operational 
level, despite the pressure from top management: “There is this real push at management level 
to use a better business case philosophy, to try and develop business cases here with rigour, 
…what is the financial risk, what is the delivery risk, what is the operational risk, what is the 
reputational risk associated with it and also identifying the value for money for that project” 
(EM3, CCC). However, these systems were often not used as:  
…there was a real reluctance to put data into the system…They just saw it as 
bureaucracy and at the end of it, 3 or 4 months when the ET put the information in so 
it could be assessed, you still had projects there like $10 million road widening, $20 
million better library and that was it, that was the level of business case, or the 
demonstration of value for money. There is a lot of inertia”. (EM3, CCC) 
Staff generally rely on internal audits and the business assurance manager who they perceive 
will handle the risks and enable them to carry on with “business-as-usual”. For operational 
managers: 
I don’t think [RM] has much of an impact at all…The [Business Assurance] Manager 
managed that so at operational level they have [not bothered]. (OM2, CCC) 
Whilst WCC emphasised orchestrations in RM practical intelligibility over rules to facilitate 
decision-making, CCC prioritised superficial commonality achieved through rule compliance 
to seek legitimation, while failing to change core RM practices and activities. 
5.3.5 “Superficial commonality” for risk compliance and implementing fundamental RM 
changes 
The interplay between general understanding, practical understanding, practical 
intelligibility, teleological structures and accounting devices together in CCC led to RM 
practice being presented as a set of dispersive actions symbolically connected through 
accounting and other material arrangements to achieve superficial commonality to meet 
external regulations. Substantially, staff downplayed or diluted the identified problems rather 
than engaging and solving them. 
The attitude is very much, ‘oh well we were lucky to get away with that so we don’t 
need to worry too much about that…’ There is a real reluctance… [in contrast to] a 
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corporate organisation, to acknowledge and deal with risk… We have the staff, we have 
the expertise across the organisation but the attitude, the acceptance of the need to deal 
with this is not there. (EM3, CCC) 
Further, RM was not integrated at operational level where: “it happens by sort of good luck 
rather than good planning” (OM1, CCC). For example, business unit managers were unaware 
of the need to escalate issues, even though: “there was a clear committee structure, so on any 
particular issue there should be clear governance and council staff interchange” (EM1, CCC). 
Further demonstrating poor RM communication among operational staff, interviewees seldom 
mentioned the business assurance manager’s role and internal controls, there was no indication 
of active RM, despite a teleological structure. Hence, CCC’s operational staff attended only to 
risks within their functional responsibility, not elevating risk information to their peers, 
superiors or risk experts. The lack of open RM communication led to localised and 
disconnected decisions, and a piecemeal RM approach across CCC:  
A number of independent audits have identified that we are extremely silo-orientated as 
an organisation… If an area of risk identified doesn’t impact one particular group 
manager, it is not considered important; rather than [them considering] as an 
organisation ‘how does this risk need to be dealt with?’ So that reinforces the 
operational focus and it dilutes the sort of strategic, collective responsibility (EM1, 
CCC). 
Top management also exacerbated the limited RM discussion and communications across CCC 
as they sought to regain authority to issue building consents. This loss was a major blow to the 
rebuild effort yet, instead of utilising the teleological structure of informing councillors and 
communicating with operational staff, the CE attempted to resolve the issue internally and 
apparently stated: “‘Can you get more staff?’, ‘Yes we can’ and it was dealt with there until 
[it] reached the point of no return” (GM2, CCC). This major impediment to the city rebuild 
was not advised to elected councillors or other staff, rather the prior CE sought to avoid blame 
for CCC’s negative performance. 
Top management’s reluctance to use the teleological structures to inform operational staff 
of risks further reinforced these staff’s understanding that risk was some other person’s 
problem rather than requiring a collective organisational effort: “No, no to be honest, unless 
it’s actually forced it won’t be accepted in the short-term or even in the medium[-term]. The 
ability to…actively mitigate those risks, right through to senior management is often 
29 
 
disregarded.” (EM3, CCC). As a result, there was lack of understanding across the 
organisation on “the financial risk, the financial value-for-money”. 
The RM practice of “achieving superficial commonality” within CCC inherited from 
operations prior to the earthquakes began to change following the appointment of a new CE 
with a very different intelligibility from the previous CE. Specifically, the new CE has a hands-
on management philosophy, which has started to move the pre-existing “insular thinking” 
general understandings within CCC to that of “honesty and openness”. 
I can see it and I can feel it, there is a different motto in the place now, we have an 
acting CE, and whilst it is not related to risk, the first thing that (the CE) did from the 
get-go…first thing she has done from there, has get her arse off Level 6 and spent 
endless hours walking the building and eyeballing people and saying… “I’m the acting 
CE”, putting out very personalised e-mails almost to the point of, I thought it was going 
to, ‘is there no end in sight?’… and being very open… I think that was the lesson that 
come out the back of that, honesty and openness in what we are doing… (GM2, CCC) 
The appointment of the CE was further followed by the election of 10 new councillors out of 
14 in total. The new top management team was perceived as “a really, really nice team of 
people that have come in, with the same motivation to do things differently” (EM1, CCC). A 
change in the structure and membership of the council has resulted in similar changes in general 
understandings. Their intelligibility resonated with that of the acting CE, creating a new RM 
attitude within CCC.  
There has been a council election, and the councillors that have come in are more open 
and transparent…so [a councillor] he is quite happy to say to everyone, ‘I stuffed up, I 
shouldn’t have voted for the pay rise…but y’know I’m putting my hand up…we all make 
mistakes, please still vote for me’…Coz it’s kind of this Kiwi thing around, if you admit 
your mistake, then we all make mistakes… (GM2, CCC) 
Affectivity change was accompanied with the gradual shifting of general understanding from 
“insular thinking” to “honesty and openness”. Whilst in the past, the fear of blame attribution 
caused a preference for compliance and box-ticking, a new willingness to admit mistakes has 
reduced this fear, and started a willingness to consider taking more risks and genuinely 
managing them. Hence, practical intelligibility is gradually moving away from the “box-
ticking” mentality, to one that embodies more strategic and opportunity thinking. 
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So in the last two years, it has changed quite rapidly. So now, we’re actively involved 
in this (strategic thinking) and driving it…and that makes a big difference. And with 
the changes to the ET there will be more of a strategic focus. (OM2, CCC). 
The change of affectivity and practical intelligibility along with the appointment of new CE 
resulted in employees’ more active use of revised teleological structures. For example, new 
governance arrangements with clear segregation of duties and responsibilities are now put in 
place:  
I think there was insufficient governance last time and I think the management of risk 
and risk mitigations is an essential part of any governance. It is variable in the Council, 
however it is improving, we have a RM framework, so at the governance level, there’s 
the audit and risk committee, and then GMs and the CE have responsibilities and the 
CE is accountable, the GMs are responsible and all the units underneath have 
responsibilities around identifying [risk]. All managers are responsible. (OM2, CCC) 
While risk was reported to top management before, the new CE takes a more active role in 
reporting risk and making it informative to councillors, rather than delegating it to the lower 
management, e.g. the risk manager.  
As of this month [we had] the first Council, that information comes by way of a CE 
report so: building applications this many, granted this many, issues, whatever, any 
sort of orange lights or red lights. (EM2, CCC) 
The frequency of reporting and meeting also increased: “so we as ET meet regularly every 
week and probably at least every other week, we will be looking at those risks” (EM1, CCC). 
At the lower levels, the approach to accounting devices also changed. The risk register is 
monitored actively and used regularly to instigate discussion and risk understanding. 
Accounting devices become coupled with teleological structures to support organisational 
learning:  
I am on the ET, I also have a management team meeting with my group and so at least 
every quarter and probably more like every 2 months we go back to the risk register 
and review it…so it is about that regular going back, reporting back, [asking] have we 
challenged people in terms of have we got things on. I talk to my managers, they can 
go back to their teams and they will talk back through their teams as well. (GM1, CCC) 
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With the more active use of teleological structures, there is more connectedness between 
management levels and the voice of lower management was taken more seriously with regards 
to risk identification and assessment, as opposed to being disregarded as before: 
…each of our groups prioritises or ranks their risks and the ET look at those and 
aggregate them up to something that is more strategic and also adds something to it so 
they end up with a separate list for the whole organisation… (OM2, CCC) 
Overall, despite the earthquake risk event, there was resistance to RM change, with “insular 
thinking” general understanding and a CE with a “minimising important issues” practical 
intelligibility. This general understanding, reinforced by certain teleological structures and the 
affectivity of “fears of wrong-doings”, resulted in “independent processing” and “box-ticking” 
practical intelligibility. However, the new CE and her practical intelligibility is beginning to 
drive a change in general understanding from “insular thinking” to “honesty and openness”, 
which has already shown effects on affectivity, practical intelligibility and teleological 
structures within CCC’s RM.  
 
6. Discussion  
Prior research devoted analytical attention to rules, general understandings, practical 
understandings and teleological structures when drawing on Schatzki’s (2002) theoretical 
framework to study accounting and other organisational practices within a social site (Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2007; Jørgensen & Messner, 2010; Nama & Lowe, 2014). These studies 
examining specific organisation practices imply that individuals’ practical intelligibilities are 
impartible components. Indeed, Schatzki (2002, p.246) argues that “the actions and entities 
people encounter in settings help mould which particular intelligibility factors determine what 
makes sense for them to do – how they decide to act”. Hall et al. (2015) also show how 
individuals (i.e. risk managers) mobilise a set of tools to gain influence over executives’ 
decision making processes. We extend Hall et al. (2015) to show how individuals’ practical 
intelligibilities influence other Schatzki elements to mobilise changes in RM practice. Hence, 
our first contribution is in providing evidence of the mutually affecting relationship between 
practical intelligibility and general understanding in organising and changing RM practices. 
On the one hand, our empirics show that CEs’ practical intellibilities are an important factor 
contributing to the development of RM general understandings for both WCC and CCC. 
Through establishing good systems, placing competent managers, listening to people and 
bringing people on board, WCC’s new CE infused his preference of “approaching financial 
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sustainability” into other people’s sayings and doings. This process yielded the development 
of an “open judgement’ general understanding within WCC, which changed the previously 
widely accepted quantitative risk analysis. This was shown to be evident at top management/ 
councillor level as well as operational level. The more qualitative RM practice continued even 
after the earthquake occured. For CCC, the “insular thinking” general understanding originated 
from the previous CE’s practical intelligibility of “minimising important issues”. This resulted 
in a lack of escalation of risk issues and covering up problems within CCC in general. Changes 
in “insular thinking” general understanding were resisted following the earthquakes, until the 
new CE began exerting her “hands-on management” rationality. 
On the other hand, our research agrees with Nama and Lowe (2014), that general 
understanding sets the commonly accepted attitudes people carry in their “doing and saying”. 
We extend Nama and Lowe (2014), by arguing that these commonly accepted attitudes are not 
only “carried by people” but also significantly shape their practical intelligibility, leading to 
certain actions and activities. For example, individuals’ RM intelligibility in CCC of 
“independent processing” and “box-ticking” (“willingness to try things” and “orchestrations in 
intelligibility” within WCC) is rooted in the general understanding of “insular thinking” within 
CCC (“open judgement” within WCC). These general RM attitudes shape people’s mind-sets 
of how risks should be managed. This ‘shaping’ effect is so strong that these RM practical 
intelligibilities dominate/override the rules-based practical understanding in determining 
individuals’ RM actions to meet legislative and public expectations. For example, in CCC, the 
insular thinking led to a reluctance to manage and mitigate risks, just to ‘tick boxes’. Instead, 
‘open judgment’ evident in WCC was robust to orchestrations in the definition of risk and the 
needs of “willingness to try (different) things”, which transforms the previous compliance and 
quantiative based RM practices. 
Our argument as to the mutually affecting relationsip between general understanding and 
practical intelligibility further develops Nama and Lowe’s (2014) additions to Schatzki’s 
theoretical element of general understanding. Schatzki (2002b, p. 75) argues that “practical 
intelligbility is an individualist phenomenon and consists principally of the features possessed 
by, or that may be ascribed to, individuals such as a person’s goals, affectivity and the 
projects/tasks that s/he is pursuing”. That is, the affectivity of a practice is one important factor 
leading to individuals’ practical intelligibility. In addition, Nama and Lowe (2014) argue that 
general understanding relates to how things matter, which is reflected in the affectivity 
dimension of practices. In WCC, the open and interactive communication and the “three lines 
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of defence”, underpinned by the linking of performance evaluation (and pay rises) to risk 
practice, disseminated the “open judgement” general understanding and signals to operational 
staff how RM matters. Differently, the strict rule compliance and the lack of operational staff’ 
accountability in RM lines of defence, reinforced the “insular thinking” general understandings 
and created a sense of “not mattering” towards RM within CCC. Given that affectivity of a 
practice is closely related to emotions and moods that individuals carry when performing 
certain actions, this means that general understanding can affect individuals’ practical 
intelligibility through affectivity of a practice and individuals’ emotions and moods.  
Second, we agree with Nama and Lowe’s (2014) finding on the mutually constitutive 
relationship between general understanding and affective components of teleoaffectvie 
structures, but extend Nama and Lowe (2014) and Schatzki by proposing the inclusion of 
teleological structures into such mutually constitutive relationships. We show that end-project-
task combinations and accounting devices may be structured to influence individuals’ emotions 
and moods, which in turn shape general understanding. For example, accounting devices, such 
as performance evaluation systems linked to individuals’ routine RM processes and tasks, can 
affect their personal desire and welfare, arousing their affections of ‘mattering’ (“fear of wrong 
doings”). These affections in turn made operational staff anchor their RM actions to the general 
understanding expected by top management. The general understanding, through its influences 
on people’s affections and thus practical intelligibility, affects the performativity of teleological 
structures. These findings on the relationship between teleological structures and affection 
concur with Boedker and Chua’s (2013) idea of understanding accounting as an affective 
technology. Thus, we call for more attention to be devoted to affection when studying 
accounting and other organisational practices. 
Finally, this study adds to the RM literature by showing the critical roles that general 
understanding may play in effectuating new risk management practices. The empirical findings 
from CCC are partially consistent with Fischer and Ferlie (2013) who attribute resistance to 
RM practice change to individuals’ strong emotional attachment to pre-existing RM norms. 
Different to Fischer and Ferlie (2013), in CCC the resistance to new RM practice began to ebb 
when new practical intelligibility and teleological structures were introduced after the 
earthquake by a new CE to shift the general understanding from “insular thinking” to “honesty 
and openness”. The shift of general understanding lessened peoples’ emotional attachment to 
the pre-existing “taken-for-granted” RM practice, which is beginning to drive change. 
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The power of shifting general understanding in effectuating new RM practice is more 
salient in WCC. Specifically, the change of general understanding from rule compliance and 
quantitative analysis to open judgement and qualitative judgements (due to the new CE’s 
practical intelligibility) immediately exerted its effects on the change of WCC’s RM practice. 
As an example, top management and operational staff moved from a quantitative measuring 
and ranking of risks to a more qualitative risk assessment to recognise raw risk and mitigation 
strategies. Our findings on CCC and WCC provide additional support for Hall et al.’s (2015) 
finding on the importance of individuals’ intelligence in effectuating risk management 
decisions and actions. At the same time, Hall et al. (2015) highlight the need to enact other 
organisational changes (e.g. corporate governance and incentive changes) to match with and 
assimilate the intended strategic ends of new RM practice. Our study builds on Fisher and 
Ferlie (2013) and Hall et al. (2015) by proposing changing the general understanding as an 
important way of making RM change fundamental and sustainable. This effect is likely due to 
the mutually constitutive relationship between general understanding and emotions. Altering 
general understanding may change people's emotions that are important contributors to 
resistance to RM change. New emotions in turn are likely to fundamentally and persistently 
change individuals’ daily RM activities. More importantly, a change in general understanding 
would have wide effects across all organisational members. Together with our previous 
discussion, we argue that executives' practical intelligibility and teleological structures are 
important resources that organisations can utilise to enact changes in general understandings. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Our study utilises interviews, observations and documents to understand RM practices and 
to answer the research question of “how is risk management practice organised and how does 
it change within LAs?” We make three contributions to the accounting and RM literature. First, 
we find that practical intelligibility and general understanding mutually affect each other, 
contributing to the organising and changing of RM practice. With this finding, we extend prior 
research by arguing the importance of including practical intelligibility and its interactions with 
other Schatzki’s elements when drawing on this theory to study organisational practices. 
Second, Nama and Lowe (2014) propose to amend Schatzki by documenting a mutually 
constitutive relationship between general understanding and affective components of 
teleoaffectvie structures. This study further builds on Nama and Lowe’s (2014) proposed 
addition to Schatzki by advocating the inclusion of teleological structures into the mutually 
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constitutive relationship between general understanding and affectivity. Third, prior RM 
studies exclusively focus on the use of RM framework/mechanisms to bring about better RM 
practice despite possible failure of such framework/mechanisms to deliver expected outcomes. 
This study builds on Fisher and Ferlie (2013) and Hall et al. (2015) by proposing changing the 
general understanding (in addition to adopting RM framework and mechanisms) as an 
important way of making RM change fundamental and sustainable.  
Our study is subject to limitations. We examine only two NZ LAs and this may limit 
generalisability. The findings could be richer if we had observed RM practices directly. 
However, we have addressed this limitation by triangulating interviews, observations and 
documentary data, validating opinions across different interviewees and observing public 
meetings. Future research should aim to further test Schatzki’s social site analysis, to examine 
the effect of rules, understandings, teleological structures, and accounting on RM practices, in 
other contexts and time periods. As shown by our study, Schatzki’s ontology provides a rich 
analytical framework to move beyond description or prescription of RM, to uncovering why 
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